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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 At a Local Shire Council meeting in Western Australia, a Council-
lor said “we shoot them” in response to a discussion about a group of 
homeless Aboriginal people.1 The Councillor was ordered to pay 
$1,000 compensation by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission, and he also apologized and completed cultural aware-
ness training.2 In an interview with a Western Australian newspaper 
journalist, a senior officer of the “One Nation” political party said 
“ ‘[h]ome invasions are ethnically based, Lebanese or Iranian, not 
Australian.’ ”3 He was ordered to pay $1,000 compensation and pub-
lish a retraction.4 A resident of a Sydney apartment block yelled rac-
ist comments at another resident and was ordered to pay $5,000 
compensation.5 A diner owner whose premises had been vandalized 
put up signs, such as “Not open due to destructive Aborigines,” and 
the noticeboard then attracted racist graffiti that was not removed by 
the owner.6 The diner owner was ordered to apologize to a respected 
Aboriginal community leader who had complained.7 
 Australia has a network of state and federal laws that proscribe 
hate speech of this kind.8 The amounts of compensation ordered in 
these cases are relatively small, but in many cases, it is the orders to 
                                                                                                                     
 ∗  Senior Lecturer, Flinders University of South Australia Law School. 
 1. Jacobs v. Fardig (1999) E.O.C. ¶ 93-016, (1999) HREOCA 9, ¶ 3.1 (find at 
http://austlii.edu.au). 
 2. Id., (1999) HREOCA ¶ 6. 
 3. Feghaly v. Oldfield (2000) E.O.C. ¶ 93-090. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Anderson v. Thompson (2001) N.S.W.A.D.T. 11, ¶ 37 (find at http://austlii.edu.au). 
 6. Warner v. Kucera (2001) E.O.C. ¶ 93-137. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See, e.g., Racial Discrimination Act, 1975 (Austl.); Discrimination Act, 1991 
(Austl. Cap. Terr.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1977 (N.S.W.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1991 
(Queensl.); Racial Vilification Act, 1996 (S. Austl.); Civil Liability Act, 1936, § 73 (S. 
Austl.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1998 (Tas.); Racial and Religious Tolerance Act, 2001 
(Vict.); Criminal Code, §§ 76-80F (W. Austl.). 
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apologize,9 to retract, or to cease distribution that have the greatest 
impact upon those found culpable and upon broader public debate. 
The prospect of being embroiled in proceedings before a commission, 
tribunal, or court can have a chilling effect on free speech. In cases in 
which the complaints have been dismissed,10 the speakers and pub-
lishers were nevertheless drawn into conciliation or court proceed-
ings; this can have a chilling effect on future speech. Many of the 
cases involving hate speech attract little attention outside of the law 
reports, but there have been some high-profile cases that have come 
before the courts and have been reported in the media.11 These cases 
include a claim of vilification of Islam brought against a Christian 
preacher12 and complaints about Holocaust denial and anti-Semitic 
literature.13  
 Referred to as “racial vilification” in Australia,14 these hate speech 
laws at state and federal levels have an impact on public debate by 
                                                                                                                     
 9. Apologies are sometimes ordered, but some magistrates and judges have ex-
pressed doubts about the utility of such orders. “An apology should come from the heart 
and not be the subject of a court order.” San v. Dirluck Pty Ltd. (2005) 222 A.L.R. 91, ¶ 49, 
(2005) F.M.C.A. 750, ¶ 49 (find at http://austlii.edu.au). 
 10. Several complaints were not sustained as vilification. See, e.g., Miller v. Wertheim 
(2002) E.O.C. ¶ 93-182, (2002) E.O.C. ¶ 93-223, (2002) F.C.A. 156, ¶ 1 (find at 
http://austlii.edu.au) (involving criticism of the Orthodox Jewish community in a speech at 
a Jewish Board of Deputies meeting); Bryl v. Kovacevic (1999) E.O.C. ¶ 93-022, (1999) 
HREOCA 11, ¶¶ 1, 7 (find at http://austlii.edu.au) (involving a theatrical play about the 
turmoil in Bosnia-Herzegovina); Francis v. YWCA Austl. (2006) V.C.A.T. 2456, ¶ 3 (find at 
http://austlii.edu.au) (involving a t-shirt with the words “get your rosaries off my ovaries”); 
Fletcher v. Salvation Army Austl. (2005) V.C.A.T. 1523, ¶ 1 (find at http://austlii.edu.au) 
(involving a claim that Christian teaching vilified witchcraft); Judeh v. Jewish Nat’l Fund 
of Austl. Inc. (2003) V.C.A.T. 1254, ¶¶ 9, 10 (find at http://austlii.edu.au) (involving an ad-
vertisement in a newspaper with the outline of a map of Israel that incorporated Palestin-
ian semiautonomous areas). 
 11. See, e.g., Amir Butler, Opinion, Muzzling the Haters Doesn’t Mean That Hate Has 
Vanished, AGE (Melbourne), Jan. 4, 2005, at 11; Ian Gerard, Opinion, ‘Racist’ Website Ma-
terial Banned, AUSTRALIAN, Sept. 18, 2002, at 5; Moira Rayner, Why Not Just Let the Truth 
Speak for Itself?, AGE (Melbourne), Jan. 6, 2005, at 11; Brett Stubbs, Campaigner to Defy 
Race Law Ruling, MERCURY (Hobart), Sept. 27, 2000, at 9; Barney Zwartz, Pastors Will 
Keep ‘Telling Truth’ on Muslims, AGE (Melbourne), Dec. 15, 2006, at 5; Barney Zwartz, 
Pastors Vow to Go to Jail on Hate Case, AGE (Melbourne), June 23, 2005, at 3. 
 12. Catch the Fire Ministries, Inc. v. Islamic Council of Vict. Inc. (2006) 15 V.R. 207, 
(2006) V.S.C.A. 284 (find at http://austlii.edu.au). The matter was remitted to the tribunal 
by the Court of Appeal and then settled by the parties. Press Release, Vict. Civil and Ad-
min. Tribunal, Joint Statement of the Islamic Council of Victoria Inc., Catch the Fire Min-
istries Inc., Daniel Nalliah and Daniel Scot (June 22, 2007), available at 
http://www.vcat.vic.gov.au. 
 13.  E.g., Jones v. Bible Believers’ Church (2007) F.C.A. 55, ¶ 2 (find at 
http://austlii.edu.au) (material published on the Internet); Toben v. Jones (2003) 129 
F.C.R. 515, 517, (2003) F.C.A. 137, ¶ 2 (find at http://austlii.edu.au) (material published on 
the Internet); Jones v. Scully (2002) 120 F.C.R. 243, 246, (2002) F.C.A. 1080, ¶ 1 (find at 
http://austlii.edu.au) (material published in pamphlets). 
 14. See, e.g., Discrimination Act, 1991, §§ 66-67 (Austl. Cap. Terr.); Anti-
Discrimination Act, 1977, § 20C-20D (N.S.W.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1991, §§ 124A, 
131A (Queensl.); Racial Vilification Act, 1996 (S. Austl.); Racial and Religious Tolerance 
Act, 2001, § 7 (Vict.). 
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proscribing some, but not all, kinds of vilifying speech. The extent of 
that impact, and whether the legislation can be justified on public 
policy grounds, has been a topic of concern for many years.15 When 
these laws were passed, there was significant debate in the media 
and parliaments about the potential impact upon free speech.16 A 
good deal of attention in that early debate was focused on criminal 
sanctions that have never been deployed. Concerns about the impact 
of the civil complaint procedures were allayed by exemptions de-
signed to protect public debate, the media, academic inquiry, and ar-
tistic expression. The impact of these exemptions is the central 
theme in this Article.  
 With limited constitutional protection for free speech and a com-
plex network of legislation, Australia offers an interesting case study 
for the impact of hate speech laws in practice.17 In this Article, I ar-
gue that, in many cases, the Australian racial vilification laws favor 
certain voices over others. Privileged speakers, who conform to judi-
cial interpretations of reasonableness, are exempted; those who use 
inflammatory or intemperate language are silenced. These laws re-
strict the form of expression rather than the racist message itself. 
Thus, it is not so much what you say, but how you say it.  
 Public debate can be impoverished by this exclusion of marginal 
voices that do not conform to legal standards of reasonableness and 
so are subject to hate speech laws. At the same time, racist material 
communicated by speakers who know and are comfortable with the 
rules of the game can undermine the objectives of the legislation. 
Court findings that expressions of racial hatred are “reasonable,” 
even though such expressions are hateful, are troubling. Exemptions 
of this kind of speech may be treated as authoritative and therefore 
reinforce the racist messages that the legislation was intended          
to proscribe. 
                                                                                                                     
 15. See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 24-25 (citing popular and scholarly debate on 
impact and justification of racial vilification laws). 
 16. Luke McNamara & Tamsin Solomon, The Commonwealth Racial Hatred Act 1995: 
Achievement or Disappointment?, 18 ADEL. L. REV. 259, 271-77 (1996) (Austl). 
 17. As early as 1995, Luke McNamara called for the adoption of empirical perspec-
tives and “an assessment of the relative merits of different models of legal intervention.” 
Luke McNamara, The Merits of Racial Hatred Laws: Beyond Free Speech, 4 GRIFFITH L. 
REV. 29, 30 (1995). Katharine Gelber and Adrienne Stone have argued that because hate 
speech laws exist in Australia, an “intellectual space” is raised for questions such as: who 
are the hate speakers and what types of hate speech are targeted by these laws? Katharine 
Gelber & Adrienne Stone, Introduction, in HATE SPEECH AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN 
AUSTRALIA xiii, xiv (Katharine Gelber & Adrienne Stone eds., 2007). 
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II.   DELICATE FLORA: FREE SPEECH IN AUSTRALIA 
 Free speech in Australia has been described as “a delicate plant.”18 
Australia does not have an entrenched protection for free speech, but 
there is some limited protection for political expression implied from 
our system of representative government established by the Austra-
lian Constitution.19 This implied freedom is limited to communica-
tions relating to political or governmental matters. Legislation that 
burdens political communications may still be valid if it is reasonably 
appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end that is compatible 
with the maintenance of a system of representative and responsible 
government. The Federal Court20 and Victorian Court of Appeal21 
have held that the vilification statutes are reasonably and appropri-
ately adapted to serve the legitimate end of preventing vilification.22 
 While the Australian Constitution was no barrier to passing Aus-
tralia’s hate speech laws, concerns for the protection of free speech 
were raised when the laws were introduced, and free speech sensi-
tivities have shaped judicial interpretation of the laws.23 There were 
free speech debates in the press24 and amongst academics25 when the 
                                                                                                                     
 18. MICHAEL CHESTERMAN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AUSTRALIAN LAW: A DELICATE 
PLANT 1 (2000). 
 19. This implied freedom of political expression has been developed in a series of High 
Court decisions dating back to 1992. See, e.g., Coleman v. Power (2004) 220 C.L.R. 1, 
(2004) H.C.A. 39 (find at http://austlii.edu.au); Lange v. Austl. Broad. Corp. (1997) 189 
C.L.R. 520, (1997) H.C.A. 25 (find at http://austlii.edu.au); Australian Capital Television v. 
Commonwealth (1992) 177 C.L.R. 106, (1992) H.C.A. 45 (find at http://austlii.edu.au). 
 20. Toben v. Jones (2003) 129 F.C.R. 515, 551-52, (2003) F.C.A. 137, ¶¶ 141-48 (find 
at http://austlii.edu.au); Jones v. Scully (2002) 120 F.C.R. 243, 304-06, (2002) F.C.A. 1080, 
¶¶ 234-42 (find at http://austlii.edu.au). 
 21. Catch the Fire Ministries, Inc. v. Islamic Council of Vict. Inc. (2006) 15 V.R. 207, 
¶¶ 113, 210, (2006) V.S.C.A. 284, ¶¶ 113, 210 (find at http://austlii.edu.au). 
 22.  See, e.g., Nicholas Aroney, The Constitutional (In)validity of Religious Vilification 
Laws: Implications for Their Interpretation, 34 FED. L. REV. 287 (2006) (Austl.) (discussing 
the religious vilification laws as they relate to the High Court’s decisions, which imply a 
freedom of political communication). 
 23. Luke McNamara, Does a Bill of Rights Matter?: Comparing Australia and New 
Zealand, in HATE SPEECH AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AUSTRALIA, supra note 17, at 194, 
212-13; LUKE MCNAMARA, REGULATING RACISM: RACIAL VILIFICATION LAWS IN AUSTRALIA 
102-07 (2002). 
 24. See, e.g., Robert Manne, Opinion, Race Bill an Offence Against Free Speech, AGE 
(Melbourne), Nov. 16, 1994, at 19 (arguing against the Bill on the grounds of free speech); 
Racial Bill Problems, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Nov. 2, 1994, at 16 (stating that the case 
for vilification legislation is not proved); Colin Rubenstein & Michael Kapel, Sending out 
the Right Signals, AGE (Melbourne), Nov. 21, 1994, at 9 (arguing for the Bill). 
 25. See, e.g., Nancy Hennessy & Paula Smith, Have We Got It Right? NSW Racial Vi-
lification Laws Five Years On, 1(1) AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 249 (1994); Jeremy Jones, Holo-
caust Denial: “Clear and Present” Racial Vilification, 1(1) AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 169 (1994); 
Melinda Jones, Empowering Victims of Racial Hatred by Outlawing Spirit-Murder, 1(1) 
AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 299 (1994) [hereinafter Jones, Empowering Victims]; Kathleen Ma-
honey, Hate Vilification Legislation and Freedom of Expression: Where Is the Balance?, 1(1) 
AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 353 (1994); Tamsin Solomon, Problems in Drafting Legislation 
Against Racist Activities, 1(1) AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 265 (1994). 
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Federal Racial Hatred Bill was introduced in 1994.26 Free speech was 
raised both as grounds for opposing and supporting the legislation. 
Legislative restrictions on speech were decried by some commenta-
tors, but other commentators argued that hate speech, if unopposed, 
has a chilling effect because it excludes some minority participants 
from public debate and belittles their voices if raised.27 The Explana-
tory Memorandum to the Federal Bill declared that the legislation 
maintained a “balance between the right to free speech and the pro-
tection of individuals and groups from harassment and fear because 
of their race, colour or national or ethnic origin.”28 In his Second 
Reading Speech on the Racial Hatred Bill, the Federal Attorney Gen-
eral, Mr. Lavarch, stated: 
The bill places no new limits on genuine public debate. Australians 
must be free to speak their minds, to criticise actions and policies 
of others and to share a joke. The bill does not prohibit people from 
expressing ideas or having beliefs, no matter how unpopular the 
views may be to many other people. The law has no application to 
private conversations. Nothing which is said or done reasonably 
and in good faith in the course of any statement, publication, dis-
cussion or debate made or held for an academic, artistic or scien-
tific purpose or any other purpose in the public interest will be pro-
hibited by the law.29 
The Attorney General’s argument was that the legislation had built-
in protection for free speech in the form of exemptions for certain 
kinds of “genuine” speech that is judged to be reasonable and in    
good faith.30  
III.   AN OVERVIEW OF AUSTRALIAN RACIAL VILIFICATION LAWS 
 The Australian racial vilification laws vary between state and 
federal jurisdictions, but they include criminal offenses,31 civil com-
plaints-based processes in tribunals and commissions,32 and tort 
                                                                                                                     
 26. Nick Poynder, Racial Vilification Legislation, ABORIGINAL L. BULL., Dec. 1994, at 
4 (discussing Racial Hatred Bill 1994), available at http://austlii.law.uts.edu.au/ 
au/journals/AboriginalLB/1994/57.html; see also Racial Hatred Act, 1995 (Austl.) 
(subsequently enacted variant of the 1994 Bill). 
 27. Jones, Empowering Victims, supra note 25, at 310-11. 
 28. H.R., RACIAL HATRED BILL, EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 1 (1994) (Austl.). 
 29. Parliamentary Deb., H. Hansard 3337 (Nov. 15, 1994) (statement of Att’y        
Gen. Lavarch). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Discrimination Act, 1991, § 67 (Austl. Cap. Terr.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1977, 
§ 20D (N.S.W.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1991, § 131A (Queensl.); Racial Vilification Act, 
1996, § 4 (S. Austl.); Racial and Religious Tolerance Act, 2001, § 24 (Vict.); Criminal Code, 
§§ 77-80D (W. Austl.). 
 32. Racial Discrimination Act, 1975, § 18C (Austl.); Discrimination Act, 1991, § 66 
(Austl. Cap. Terr.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1977, § 20C (N.S.W.); Anti-Discrimination 
Act, 1991, § 124A (Queensl.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1998, § 19 (Tas.); Racial and Reli-
gious Tolerance Act, 2001, § 7 (Vict.). 
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law.33 The state regulatory schemes operate concurrently with the 
federal laws, and the Federal Act makes it clear that there is no in-
consistency intended by these overlapping regimes.34 The first of the 
laws was passed in the State of New South Wales in 1989, and other 
states and territories followed throughout the 1990s. The federal 
provisions commenced in 1995, and the last states to pass legislation 
in this field were Queensland and Victoria in 2001.35 In some states, 
the grounds of vilification extend to sexuality, homosexuality, trans-
gender and transsexuality,36 HIV or AIDS status,37 and disability.38 
In this Article, I will concentrate on racial vilification that is covered 
by all of the state and federal acts. I will also focus on the civil com-
plaints-based schemes since those are the provisions that have    
been enforced.39 
 To truly understand the impact of the state and federal legislation 
on free speech, it is necessary to investigate the way that the legisla-
tion has been used by complainants. Who, or at least what areas, at-
tract complaints of racial hatred? The civil complaints are com-
menced before administrative commissions and tribunals.40 At the 
federal level, conciliation by the Human Rights and Equal Opportu-
nity Commission is the first step in the process; if conciliation fails, 
the matter may proceed to civil action in the courts. In the Federal 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission’s annual report, 
the statistics for lodgment of complaints provide a useful overview of 
the range of disputes that come into the system.41 Many complaints 
                                                                                                                     
 33. See, e.g., Civil Liability Act, 1936, § 73 (S. Austl.). 
 34. Racial Discrimination Act, 1975, §§ 6A, 18F (Austl.). 
 35. Anti-Discrimination Amendment Act, 2001 (Queensl.); Racial and Religious Tol-
erance Act, 2001 (Vict.). The Northern Territory is the only jurisdiction without any local 
hate speech laws, but, as with the other Australian states and territories, the Northern 
Territory is covered by the Federal Act. 
 36. Discrimination Act, 1991, §§ 66(1)(b)-(c), 67(1)(d)(ii)-(iii) (Austl. Cap. Terr.); Anti-
Discrimination Act, 1977, §§ 38R-38T, 49ZS-49ZTA (N.S.W.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 
1991, § 124A (Queensl.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1998, § 19(c) (Tas.). 
 37. Discrimination Act, 1991, §§ 66(1)(d), 67(1)(d)(iv) (Austl. Cap. Terr.); Anti-
Discrimination Act, 1977, §§ 49ZXA-49ZXC (N.S.W.). 
 38. Anti-Discrimination Act, 1998, § 19(b) (Tas.). 
 39. There are no federal criminal sanctions. Most of the states have criminal offenses, 
but Dan Meagher has reported that only one person has been convicted of a racial vilifica-
tion crime in Australia since the first law was passed in 1989. Dan Meagher, So Far No 
Good: The Regulatory Failure of Criminal Racial Vilification Laws in Australia, 17 PUB. L. 
REV. 209, 210 (2006). 
 40. Katharine Gelber, Hate Speech and the Australian Legal and Political Landscape, 
in HATE SPEECH AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AUSTRALIA, supra note 17, at 2, 9 (describing 
“more mundane manifestations of hate speech”). 
 41.  See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 
2006–2007, at 74 (2007), available at http://www.humanrights.gov.au/about/publications/ 
annual_reports/2006_2007/pdf/hreoc_ar2006-07.pdf [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 2006–
2007]; see also Australian Human Rights Commission, Annual Reports, 
http://www.humanrights.gov.au/about/publications/annual_reports/index.html (collection 
of annual reports from 1996 to present) (last visited Nov. 12, 2008). 
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are dismissed, withdrawn, or resolved, and thus only a few proceed to 
the courts.42 The annual reports show a general decline in the num-
ber of racial hatred complaints made under the Federal Act over the 
last few years. The number of these complaints fell from a high of 
186 complaints in 1996-1997 to 44 complaints in 2006-2007.43 The 
figures also disclose that disputes between individuals in neighbor-
hoods and in the workplace make up a large proportion of the com-
plaints received.44 Indeed, when the categories of “public debate,” 
“media,” and “Internet” are combined, they only make up between 
twenty and forty-five percent of complaints in any year.45 Some of the 
high-profile and problematic cases discussed below that reach the 
courts involve the media and other participants in public discourse. 
However, it is worth noting the significant number of complaints that 
focus on personal, neighborhood, or workplace disputes. This might 
be interpreted as the regime fulfilling an educative role that was in-
tended by Parliament when the Act was passed, but the conciliation 
proceedings are confidential, and so the cases that do not go beyond 
the first stage have limited impact beyond those directly involved.46 
Equally, the number of personal, neighborhood, and workplace dis-
putes can be interpreted as a disproportionate burden being imposed 
upon individuals and employers while a racist discourse continues 
relatively unchecked in privileged domains such as politics and the 
commercial media.47 
                                                                                                                     
 42. See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT 2006–2007, supra note 41, at 74 (reporting figures 
reported for 2006-2007 for conciliation and termination of all complaints of racial 
discrimination (racial hatred figures not separately recorded)). When complaints are 
terminated by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, the complainant 
may apply to have the allegations heard and determined by the Federal Court or the 
Federal Magistrates Court. Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act, 1986, 
§ 46PO (Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ 
hraeocpacaa19861054. 
 43. ANNUAL REPORT 2006–2007, supra note 41, at 74; HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 1996 - 1997, at 18 (1997), available at 
http://www.humanrights.gov.au/pdf/annual_reports/ar97.pdf. 
 44. See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT 2006–2007, supra note 41, at 74. 
 45. Australian Human Rights Commission, supra note 41. Statistics for racial hatred 
areas of complaints were not reported in 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 annual reports. 
 46. Although equivocal about conciliation, Margaret Thornton has argued that it can 
create a space where small victories might be achieved for minorities. MARGARET 
THORNTON, THE LIBERAL PROMISE: ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION IN AUSTRALIA     
170 (1990). 
 47. Katharine Gelber has investigated examples of the Australian Government as a 
hate speaker in immigration controversies. Katharine Gelber, Hate Speech and the Austra-
lian Legal and Political Landscape, in HATE SPEECH AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN 
AUSTRALIA, supra note 17, at 2, 14. 
30  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:23 
 
 The harm threshold for civil complaints48 varies between the state 
and federal schemes. In the states, the threshold is higher: “to incite 
hatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person 
or group of persons on the ground of . . . race.”49 The focus of the 
harm threshold in the states is the impact on the audience and 
whether others are likely to be incited. In all jurisdictions, an essen-
tial element of the unlawful conduct is that the act must be done     
in public.50 
 When considering the concept of “incitement” in the state acts, 
there is no need to prove intention to incite.51 Rather, the focus is on 
the effects of the public act. It is not sufficient to show that a state-
ment was incorrect or might be inflammatory; there must be incite-
ment of hatred.52 The provisions do not turn on proof of actual in-
citement of a specific person, but rather the likely effect. However, 
the evidence of actual effect may be relevant to the assessment of 
remedies.53 The incitement is the effect of the words on an “ordinary 
reasonable” person, which is someone who is not “malevolently in-
clined [n]or free from susceptibility to prejudice.”54 In a New South 
Wales case involving a newspaper article about Palestinians, counsel 
for The Australian Financial Review submitted that an ordinary, 
reasonable reader would anticipate that the paper would print bal-
ancing material, such as follow-up letters, in response to the article 
and other opinion pieces.55 The tribunal did not accept that argu-
ment.56 This hypothetical person who could envisage a diverse ongo-
ing debate was “not the ordinary, reasonable person, but rather a 
person who is virtually free from susceptibility to prejudice.”57 Nor 
                                                                                                                     
 48. The harm threshold for the criminal provisions in most of the states is threats of, 
or incitement to threaten, physical harm. Discrimination Act, 1991, § 67 (Austl. Cap. 
Terr.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1977, § 20D (N.S.W.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1991, § 
131A (Queensl.); Racial Vilification Act, 1996, § 4 (S. Austl.); Racial and Religious Toler-
ance Act, 2001, § 24 (Vict.). In Western Australia, the offense involves incitement of racial 
animosity or racist harassment. Criminal Code, §§ 77-80D (W. Austl.). 
 49. Discrimination Act, 1991, § 66 (Austl. Cap. Terr.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1977, 
§ 20C (N.S.W.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1991, § 124A (Queensl.); see also Civil Liability 
Act, 1936, § 73 (S. Austl.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1998, § 19 (Tas.); Racial and Religious 
Tolerance Act, 2001, § 7 (Vict.). 
 50. The Federal and Victorian versions require that the act not be done in private. 
Racial Discrimination Act, 1975, § 18C (Austl.); Racial and Religious Tolerance Act, 2001, § 
12 (Vict.). 
 51. Kazak v. John Fairfax Publ’ns Ltd. (2000) N.S.W.A.D.T. 77, ¶ 26 (find at 
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was it relevant that a reader understands that people hold divergent 
views. “The ordinary reader may well be aware for example, that 
people have extreme views on white supremacy. That does not make 
statements about white supremacy any less likely to incite hatred.”58 
 At the federal level, the harm threshold is lower:  
It is unlawful for a person to do an act, otherwise than in private, 
if . . . that the act is reasonably likely . . . to offend, insult, humili-
ate or intimidate another person or a group of people . . . because 
of the race, colour or national or ethnic origin of the other person 
or . . . group.59  
A mere slight is insufficient.60 The focus here is on the victims of the 
vilifying speech and whether they are “reasonably likely” to be of-
fended, insulted, humiliated, or intimidated. Dan Meagher has criti-
cized the lack of any detailed analysis or reasoning in many cases in 
which this harm threshold was applied and has argued that it is of-
ten exercised as a “ ‘personal discretion to do justice,’ ”61 leaving the 
impression of arbitrary decisionmaking in some cases. 
 The “reasonably likely” phrase incorporates an objective stan-
dard62 and has been interpreted as a “reasonable victim” of the rele-
vant race or ethnic background informed by community standards. 
The historical or socioeconomic situation of the group is relevant.63 
The provisions are not limited to the protection of minority groups, 
but decisionmakers have held that reasonable members of majority 
groups are less likely to be offended. Referring to English people as 
“[p]oms”64 and yelling abusive comments at white prison officers65 
have been held not to meet the requisite harm threshold. In a case 
involving white prison officers, a woman was refused permission to 
visit a prisoner, and she yelled abusive comments at the prison offi-
cer who was at the gatehouse.66 The Magistrate was clearly reluctant 
to hold against the woman and decided that, while much of the lan-
guage she used was offensive, the racial element, using the epithet 
“white,” was something that a reasonable officer would not have 
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found offensive.67 The Magistrate interpreted the impact of the alleg-
edly racially offensive words in the context of a power imbalance be-
tween the white prison officer and the Aboriginal woman abusing 
him. In that case, the Aboriginal woman was railing against a deci-
sion of the prison officials to refuse her entry that she could do noth-
ing to change.68 Interpreting “reasonable” victims in this way can 
avoid the potential problem, raised by some commentators, that 
members of victimized groups may be punished for hate speech di-
rected against dominant groups.69 Similarly, the Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunity Commission held that a spoof documentary, 
which reversed the roles of ethnographers with Africans studying 
Austrian communities, was not reasonably likely to offend Austri-
ans.70 When enacting the racial hatred provisions, the Legislature 
clearly did not have in mind that these kinds of cases would be 
brought by white complainants. 
IV.   EXEMPTION OF “REASONABLE” ACTS DONE IN “GOOD FAITH” 
 To properly understand the outcomes of racial hatred complaints, 
it is necessary to also carefully consider the exemptions. There are 
exemptions in the state and federal statutes that protect acts done 
reasonably and in good faith for academic, artistic, scientific, or re-
search purposes, or acts done in the public interest, including both 
discussion and debate.71 When the exemptions were included in the 
federal bill, they were criticized in submissions made to a Senate in-
quiry as being a “bonanza for lawyers” because of the imprecision of 
the words “fair” and “reasonable.”72 The Senate inquiry also raised 
concerns about who might or might not benefit from the exemptions: 
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“ ‘The effect of that provision could well be simply to discriminate be-
tween the sophisticated and the unsophisticated racist: to give the 
likes of David Irving a free run, and yet to make unlawful a rela-
tively harmless schoolyard taunt.’ ”73 
 A spokesperson for the Australian Arabic Council was also critical 
of the proposed exemption during the Senate inquiry: “ ‘[T]he effects 
of the actions exempted are no less serious than the racist actions, 
and the grounds for exemptions do not mitigate the effect that the 
bill is ostensibly trying to address.’ ”74 The Senate Committee con-
cluded that the exemptions might allow acts that lead to offense, in-
sult, intimidation, or humiliation, but that it was necessary to sup-
port constitutional validity75 by accommodating freedom of expres-
sion in this way. 
 The Minority Committee Report in the Senate inquiry expressed 
similar concerns about the exemptions in relation to artistic per-
formances: 
[T]he exclusion of artistic performances from the scope of the civil 
provision of the Bill makes it laughable. A comedian can, in the 
guise of an artistic performance, tell blatantly racist jokes on na-
tional television, and sell videotapes of the program for personal 
profit, but those some [sic] jokes told by an ordinary citizen in a 
public place such as a hotel or club, could render him/her subject to 
civil proceedings . . . .  
If the Government is truly concerned to stamp out racism, then 
which is the greater evil: a racist joke told on national television, 
or, the same joke told in the relative confines of a hotel or club?76 
These concerns have been vindicated by some cases brought by Abo-
riginal complainants. For example, in a case involving a stand-up 
comedian going by the stage name “King Billy Cokebottle,” the come-
dian, who was not Aboriginal, dressed up as if he were Aboriginal by 
using black face paint.77 The Complainant found the character’s 
name offensive and argued that use of “Kriol” English with mispro-
nunciations held Aboriginal people up to ridicule, mockery, and con-
tempt.78 The Magistrate agreed that the act was a “grotesque carica-
ture”79 and said, “Aboriginal people have been the subject of racial 
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discrimination and prejudice throughout the European settlement of 
Australia. As a result, they are likely to be more sensitive about 
jokes directed towards them, as they are members of a minority 
group, which is significantly socially disadvantaged.”80 The Magis-
trate accepted that the act was vulgar and in poor taste but also rec-
ognized that it was comedic in intention; he concluded that “the 
character has more licence than a politician or social commentator to 
express views. In the context of a stand-up comedy performance, the 
offence implicit in much of [the] material does not appear to me to be 
out of proportion.”81  
 When it comes to comedy and artistic work, the courts allow a 
margin of tolerance that is not necessarily extended to speakers in 
other contexts. In a case concerning a cartoon in a Western Austra-
lian newspaper, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commis-
sion held that a “reasonable” Aboriginal person would be offended by 
the work,82 but that the newspaper publisher was protected by the 
exemption. The Commission concluded that, “[w]hile it may be ar-
gued that the cartoon could be characterised as ‘exaggerated’ or ‘pre-
judiced’, I do not consider that it was sufficiently exaggerated or pre-
judiced (having regard to the surrounding circumstances) to breach 
the standard of reasonableness.”83 
 Given the objectives of the Act, the idea that a “reasonable” person 
may be prejudiced is troubling. The cartoon in the case entitled “Alas 
poor Yagan” was published during a public controversy about the re-
turn of the skull of an Aboriginal man that had been sent to England 
and displayed in a museum in Liverpool in the nineteenth century.84 
The return of Aboriginal remains from museums is a matter of public 
interest, and in this case, there were disputes within indigenous 
communities about who had the right to negotiate and arrange the 
return.85 There was also a wider public debate about government 
grants given to representatives to travel to London where the repre-
sentatives negotiated the return of the remains.86 The cartoon lam-
pooned these events.87 The paper that published the cartoon could 
have discussed the government funding of the trip and the disputes 
within the Aboriginal communities without publishing the demean-
ing cartoon. 
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 The Commission’s decision that the cartoon was published “rea-
sonably and in good faith” as an artistic work or as part of a debate 
in the public interest was upheld when reviewed by a single judge of 
the Federal Court and on appeal by the majority in the full Federal 
Court.88 In a dissenting judgment, Justice Lee argued that the car-
toon was humiliating and demeaning and that the reasonableness of 
the newspaper’s decision to publish the cartoon should be judged 
against the harm it may cause: 
Such harm . . . would be the extent to which that part of the com-
munity which consisted of persons who held racially-based views 
destructive of social cohesion, or persons susceptible to the forma-
tion of such opinions, may be reinforced, encouraged or embold-
ened in such attitudes by the publication, on the ground of race, of 
a cartoon which, irrespective of the intent of the artist and of the 
purpose of the publisher, was capable of being seen by such per-
sons as providing support or justification from an authoritative 
source for views grounded on racial antipathy.89 
In relation to the requirement of good faith, Justice Lee argued that 
the publisher should have exercised prudence, caution, and diligence, 
and endeavored to avoid or minimize the harmful consequences.90 
 The majority judges upheld the Commission’s decision that the 
cartoon was published reasonably and in good faith. Justice French 
suggested in dicta that the use of derogatory racist “slang” would 
probably not be “reasonable,”91 and yet the cartoon was held to be 
reasonable in that case. Humor and political satire is clearly ac-
cepted as part of mainstream discourse in Australia, while marginal 
voices—speakers who do not conform and who use inflammatory 
words or slang—are more likely to be excluded. 
 In the case involving a Western Australian diner owner who put 
up notices about “destructive Aborigines” after her premises were 
vandalized, her “short staccato expressions” were held not to be rea-
sonable by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission.92 
However, the Commission suggested that it might have been reason-
able “if the respondent had published a clear account of what had 
transpired and what she thought could have been done by way of re-
medying the endemic problems of anti-social behaviour by            
Aboriginal juveniles.”93 
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 In a case brought against a Perth radio station, talkback callers 
contributing to a segment called “Taxi talk” vilified members of the 
Aboriginal community who were protesting about the redevelopment 
of an old brewery site on land considered sacred by the Nyungah 
people.94 The talkback callers claimed that the Nyungah people lie 
about sacred sites and that they were really protesting because alco-
hol was no longer being brewed on the site.95 Redevelopment of the 
site and the Aboriginal protests were matters of public interest and 
had been reported in the newspapers, but the comments were not 
protected by the exemption.96 The Human Rights and Equal Oppor-
tunity Commission held that “it is the way in which the issues were 
discussed, rather than the issues themselves,” which breached the 
Act.97 The Commission held that the radio broadcaster did not act 
reasonably when it allowed the talkback callers’ comments to go to 
air.98 Clearly, comments that are exaggerated, obstinate, or preju-
diced are unlikely to be held to be reasonable. 
 In a case before the New South Wales Administrative Decisions 
Tribunal, an opinion piece with extreme negative generalizations 
about Palestinians that was published by the well-regarded The Aus-
tralian Financial Review newspaper was held to be unlawful.99 The 
newspaper publisher failed to make out its argument that it had 
acted reasonably because it subsequently published letters and arti-
cles that balanced the views expressed in the opinion piece.100 “Rea-
sonableness must be assessed at the time of publication, not at some 
unstated future time, depending on what else appears in the pa-
per.”101 Decisions such as these seriously limit the ability of the me-
dia to act as an open forum for public debate. Editors and radio talk 
show hosts are required to act as gatekeepers and exclude partici-
pants who do not behave “reasonably.”102 
 Australia has had some Holocaust denial and anti-Semitic litera-
ture cases; in those cases, the speakers were not protected by the ex-
emption for acts done reasonably and in good faith. In one case, a 
Tasmanian woman distributed pamphlets and sold books that in-
cluded claims that the Holocaust was a myth perpetuated by Jews 
for their own political purposes and that Jews are liars, fraudulent, 
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immoral, and engaged in conspiracy.103 The complaint against the 
woman, Mrs. Scully, was substantiated, and she was restrained from 
distributing the publications or others to the same effect.104 Mrs. 
Scully tried to use the proceedings to argue the “truth” of her claims 
and attempted to tender more material described by the judge as po-
lemical in character.105 The material tendered, however, was not re-
levant to the proceedings.106 Justice Hely emphasized that the con-
cern in a racial hatred proceeding is not the truth or falsity of what 
was claimed; that is a task best left to historians.107 Rather, the court 
was concerned with whether the material was reasonably likely to of-
fend.108 Justice Hely stated that one might cast doubt on the accepted 
version of the Holocaust without contravening the Australian Act, 
but in that case, the literature went beyond that discussion and vili-
fied Jews.109 Mrs. Scully attempted to rely upon the exemption for 
genuine academic purpose, but failed.110 Jews and their beliefs are 
open to criticism and scrutiny, but “[t]here is a line between legiti-
mate criticism, and prejudicial vilification of the Jewish race and 
people.”111 Judge Hely held that, in that case, the respondent did not 
act reasonably or in good faith. 
 In a similar case before the Federal Court, an Internet publisher 
uploaded material to his website that talked of the “Holocaust rack-
et.”112 Again, the Respondent’s actions were held not to be reasonable 
or in good faith and were thus not covered by the exemption.113 The 
court held that a degree of restraint was required: “[A] reasonable 
person acting in good faith would have made every effort to express 
the challenge and his views with as much restraint as was consistent 
with the communication of those views.”114 Justice Kiefel stated that, 
in other cases, “it may be that, in pursuing an historical or other dis-
course, offence cannot be avoided.”115 But in that case, the tenor of 
the publications and the use of deliberately provocative and inflam-
matory language was not reasonable or in good faith.116 The same 
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message, equally offensive, could have been published if it had been 
couched in more temperate language. 
 While the judges in these cases emphasized that Holocaust denial 
was not unlawful, the court orders in the Internet case restrained 
Toben from publishing any material that conveyed the imputation 
that there is serious doubt that the Holocaust occurred.117 The trial 
judge conceded that the practical effect of the injunction could be un-
dermined by other publishers, but she believed that the orders had 
an important symbolic and educative value.118 However, the educa-
tion may be little more than how to reformat the message; this mate-
rial reappeared in Toben’s “reporting” of the case.119 
V.   “REASONABLE” HATE SPEECH? 
 The interpretation of “reasonableness” in these Australian cases 
excuses some forms of discourse and silences others. Anna Chapman 
has criticized the way that the courts have used the reasonableness 
concept in the racial hatred litigation because it “has been, deployed 
to maintain dominant cultural narratives.”120 She is concerned that, 
from the perspective of indigenous complainants, the “reasonable-
ness” test is tied to the status quo and legitimizes the Anglo-
Australian political and legal system.121 Chapman looked at reason-
ableness from the “outsider” complainant perspective, but the argu-
ment can be made the opposite way. Protection of the dominant nar-
rative can also be criticized from the perspective of the “outsider” ac-
cused of hate speech, such as the Internet and pamphlet publishers 
and talkback callers. Speaking of the exemption for academic, artis-
tic, research, and acts done in the public interest in the New South 
Wales legislation, Margaret Thornton argued, “The exception is a 
clear manifestation of the social reality that racist acts of social elites 
are privileged, even though the harm occasioned by such acts may be 
more pervasive than that arising from a crude tract.”122 
 The exemptions included in the Australian Acts may have pla-
cated free speech advocates when the laws were passed, but public 
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discourse has been distorted in the process. These provisions are not 
neutral and have reinforced a particular kind of restrained discourse 
that may, nevertheless, have racist overtones.123 Some commentators 
in the United States have questioned the effectiveness of hate speech 
laws for this reason. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., for example, has con-
trasted the “vocabulary of indirection” with gutter epithets and ar-
gued that the former is far more painful.124 “A rule of thumb: in 
American society today, the real power commanded by the racist is 
likely to vary inversely with the vulgarity with which it                     
is expressed.”125 
 I do not argue that all hate speech should be unrestrained or that 
all the Australian legislation should be repealed. A minimum126 of 
threatening harm or inciting violence should continue to be pro-
scribed along with severe cases of incitement of hatred. But when the 
threshold is as low as the Australian Federal Act so that the giving of 
offense is caught within the provisions and free speech must be pro-
tected with wide ranging exemptions, then the threshold needs to be 
reviewed to avoid a bifurcation of public discourse with hateful 
speech being either refined or repressed. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 Public debate is impoverished by the exclusion of marginal voices, 
even if intemperate, and their exclusion creates an unequal public 
discourse that may undermine the objectives of the hate speech laws. 
Exempting newspaper cartoons and comedy acts might seem quite 
reasonable on one level, but why single out for rebuke an angry out-
burst of a diner owner when such material is accepted as the back-
drop for our national discussion of race? When hateful material is 
freely communicated by speakers who know and are comfortable 
with the rules of the game, it may be treated as authoritative and so 
reinforce entrenched racist messages the legislation was intended to 
proscribe. Australia has had a few high-profile cases involving Holo-
caust denial, vilification of Islam and Aborigines, but there has also 
been an accumulation of small matters, conciliated in confidence or 
decided in tribunals that have attracted little public attention. It is 
important that the outcomes in these commission and tribunal cases 
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are also monitored because they can have an incremental impact on 
free speech, and the inconsistencies in treatment of some speakers 
can be resented.  
 Australia offers an interesting case study for the impact of hate 
speech laws in practice. It should be a cautionary tale for advocates 
of law reform in other jurisdictions. The Federal law in Australia has 
a particularly low harm threshold of offending, and when this is 
combined with a broad exemption for certain kinds of speech, there is 
a real risk that we have created a schism within society between an 
elite free to engage in restrained, but nevertheless hateful, speech 
and an “outsider” group whose intemperate language can be silenced. 
When balancing the right to human dignity against the right to free 
expression, this is not the best way to arrange the weights. 
